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== II. Marxist Views on Buddhism ==

The Marxists referred to here actually fall into two categories: on the one hand, leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, such as Qu Qiubai (瞿秋白) and Mao Zedong (毛泽东); on the other, scholars of Buddhism who held Marxist views, such as Hou Wailu (侯外庐),<ref name="houwailu">Hou Wailu (1903–1987) was a prominent Marxist historian of Chinese thought and chief editor of the multi-volume ''General History of Chinese Thought'' (中国思想通史), discussed further below.</ref> Ren Jiyu (任继愈),<ref name="renjiyu">Ren Jiyu (1916–2009) was a scholar of religion and philosophy who directed a Marxist-oriented research program on the history of Chinese Buddhist thought from the 1950s onward, and who later served as director of the National Library of China.</ref> Fang Litian (方立天), Fan Wenlan (范文澜),<ref name="fanwenlan">Fan Wenlan (1893–1969) was a Marxist historian best known for his multi-volume ''A Concise General History of China'' (中国通史简编), discussed further below.</ref> Guo Peng (郭鹏), and Yan Beiming (严北溟).

Among the early leaders of the CCP, Chen Duxiu (陈独秀) and others held a strictly critical attitude toward Buddhism; Chen Duxiu's criticism, however, was not grounded in Marxism. Another CCP leader, Qu Qiubai, was deeply influenced by Buddhism. His path to revolution was related to his immersion in the Buddhist concept of the Bodhisattva path. He said: "The outlook on life of the Bodhisattva path, and the social view of impermanence, gradually guided me toward a bright road." (2) Buddhist otherworldliness (出世主义) and its worldview of impermanence, combined with a negation or critique of the existing political and social order, prompted Qu Qiubai to journey to the "land of Russia" (俄乡) in search of new political and social ideals.<ref name="eguxiang">The phrase 俄乡, literally "the land (or homeland) of Russia," plays on the near-homophone 饿乡, "the land of hunger," the title Qu Qiubai gave his own 1922 travelogue of Soviet Russia, 《饿乡纪程》 (''Journey to the Land of Hunger''). Li Guangliang's choice of the character 俄 rather than 饿 here should probably be read as a deliberate allusion to Qu's title rather than a simple label for the country.</ref> Strictly speaking, however, the influence of Buddhism on Qu Qiubai is chiefly evident in his emotional sensibility and attitude toward life; it is difficult to discern traces of Buddhist thought in his philosophical writings proper.

Mao Zedong, a political leader of his generation, was also an important Marxist philosopher. His views on Buddhism encompassed three aspects: the theory of Buddhist culture, the theory of excellent traditions, and the theory of harmony with socialism. (3) Although these three theories reflect some of Mao's particular understanding of Buddhism, they in fact constitute the guiding ideology behind official Buddhist policy down to the present day. The theory of Buddhist culture regarded Buddhism as a historical and cultural heritage and an important part of traditional Chinese culture. The theory of excellent traditions further specified Buddhism's essence and role: Mao advocated "promoting the excellent traditions of Buddhism," meaning that the essence of Buddhism should be distinguished from its dross, so that the essence could serve the Sinicization of Marxist philosophy and the building of socialist culture. The theory of harmony with socialism, finally, aimed at integrating Buddhism into the socialist political and cultural system.

Some of Mao's specific statements are particularly noteworthy — for instance, his claim that Shakyamuni was "a person who came from an oppressed nation," (4) who was "speaking on behalf of the oppressed people in India at that time. In order to relieve the suffering of all beings, he did not become a prince, but became a monk and founded Buddhism." He held that "the Sixth Patriarch's scripture, the Platform Sutra, belongs to the working people," (5) and highly praised the Sixth Patriarch for his cultivation of subjective initiative:

:Advocating that everything is empty is a thorough idealism, yet he foregrounded subjective initiative, which was a great leap forward in the history of Chinese philosophy. Huineng (慧能) dared to deny everything. Someone asked him: is it certain that one ascends to heaven after death? He said: not necessarily — if everyone ascends to the Western Paradise, what becomes of the people already there? He lived in the time of Emperor Taizong of Tang (唐太宗), and his teaching flourished under Empress Wu Zetian (武则天);<ref name="huinengdates">Huineng (638–713) is conventionally dated to the reigns of Gaozong and Wu Zetian rather than that of Taizong (r. 626–649), under whom he would only have been an infant; the characterization given here reflects Mao's own recollection rather than an independently verified chronology.</ref> amid the disorder of the late Tang, with the people having nowhere else to turn, his teaching became extremely popular. (6)

And again: "Buddhists and we Communists share common ground in working together to relieve the suffering of oppression borne by all beings — that is, the masses." (7) "If we broaden our view further, the aim is to set China, and the world, in good order — Buddhist teaching already contains this very idea." (8)

The study of Buddhism from a Marxist standpoint was mainly a post-1949 development. The Marxism in question is, of course, the Soviet-derived Marxist philosophy that gradually came to dominate Chinese philosophical circles from the 1930s onward. Scholarship on Chinese Buddhism conducted on this basis is represented by Hou Wailu's ''General History of Chinese Thought'' (中国思想通史) and by Ren Jiyu's ''History of Buddhist Thought in the Han and Tang Dynasties'' (汉唐佛教思想史论)<ref name="rjtitlenote">The title given here in the body of the article, 汉唐佛教思想史论, differs from that given in the article's own note 13 below for what appears to be the same work, 《汉唐佛教思想论集》 (''Collected Essays on Buddhist Thought of the Han and Tang Periods'', People's Publishing House, 1963; rev. ed. 1973). The discrepancy is present in the source text and has not been silently resolved here.</ref> and ''History of Chinese Buddhism'' (中国佛教史). Its principal features are threefold: first, it emphasizes the socio-historical conditions underlying the formation of Buddhism and Buddhist thought, using class analysis to examine the class nature and social function of specific Buddhist ideas; second, on the basis of the dichotomy between materialism and idealism, it exposes the idealist essence of Buddhist philosophy from a materialist standpoint; and third, it affirms, to a certain extent, the dialectical thought present within Buddhist philosophy. The Buddhist scholarship of Hou Wailu and his collaborators reflects their consistent approach to intellectual-historical research generally. In their study of Sengzhao (僧肇),<ref name="sengzhao">Sengzhao (384–414) was a disciple of the translator Kumārajīva and author of the ''Zhao Lun'' (肇論), a collection of treatises including "Things Do Not Shift" (物不迁論), the essay discussed in the passage that follows.</ref> for example, they argued that although Sengzhao revealed the contradictory nature of motion, he did not grasp that this contradiction is itself the dialectic between thought and its object; in exposing the contradiction between motion and the "immutability of things" (物不迁), he glimpsed dialectics, but in then opposing motion so as to affirm the immutability of things, he negated contradiction, using the law of identity of formal logic to deny dialectics — holding, metaphysically, that motion is simply motion and immutability simply immutability, the two being incapable of unification. (9) In their study of the Sanlun, or Three Treatise, school (三论宗),<ref name="sanlun">The Sanlun school, based on Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka teaching as transmitted through Kumārajīva's translations, was systematized in China chiefly by Jizang (吉藏, 549–623), whose "Essay on the Two Truths" (二谛章) is the treatise under discussion here.</ref> they concluded that Jizang's theory of the two truths (二谛论) moved, in terms of worldview, from relativism to nihilism, and, in terms of methodology, from relativism to simple negation; yet even in this relativist form, it was compelled to affirm all the things it ultimately deemed illusory, thereby blessing the impoverished present world and defending the feudal social structure:

:While this "eminent monk," who moved in and out of the palace, roamed the conceptual world of transcendence, his eyes remained fixed on the vulgar worldly interests of the ruling class. This duality was concealed by the view of the "Middle Way," and given a speculative form through extremely convoluted reasoning. (10)

In their study of Yogācāra (唯识宗), they argued that although its proponents spoke of causality in the most extravagant terms, their so-called causality was in essence merely a determination of the subject; they vainly sought to drain the entire content of objectively existing causal relations and reduce them to a causal relation confined to consciousness, one independent of the objective world and incapable of changing freely in step with material development. Once causal relations were raised into the realm of consciousness for examination in this way, their theory of causality came entirely to exclude any reflection of the development of the objective material world, becoming nothing more than an abstract, cumbersome philosophical speculation: (11)

:This subjective idealism of the Yogācāra school appears, on the surface, to be merely an abstract, transcendent metaphysics with no bearing on mundane affairs; in essence, however, it is not only absurd but reactionary. (12)

These conclusions are, needless to say, extremely one-sided. But they were simply the inevitable result of the general paradigm of intellectual-historical research prevailing at the time — a paradigm applied no less to the study of Confucianism and Daoism than to that of Buddhist thought.

The scholar most at home in applying this model to Buddhist studies, however, was undoubtedly Ren Jiyu. His ''Collected Essays on Buddhist Thought of the Han and Tang Dynasties'' (汉唐佛教思想论集) is the representative work of this research paradigm, and won high praise from Mao Zedong, who called it "phoenix feathers and unicorn horns" (凤毛麟角) — that is, something exceedingly rare. Ren Jiyu's research consistently began by analyzing the class nature of Buddhist thought. In his view, both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism arose out of the specific social and historical conditions of ancient India:

:It is [part of] India's superstructure, serving India's slave-owning class and feudal landlord class. Their theories of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (一切有部毗昙学) and the Prajñā school of emptiness (般若空宗) were ideological weapons used to numb the broad masses of the Indian people and eliminate their will to resist. (13)

He also wrote: "The harm of Buddhism in China lies chiefly in the fact that it effectively blurred class boundaries and weakened the will of the oppressed classes to resist." (14) In evaluating Prajñā thought (般若学), he argued that Buddhist Prajñā doctrine, under the guise of "compassion" for all sentient beings, launched an ideological offensive against everyone who sought to face reality squarely; and in evaluating the doctrine of nirvana and Buddha-nature (涅槃佛性学说), he held that the slogan "all sentient beings have Buddha-nature" — a form of passive egalitarianism — functioned as opium for all oppressed classes, its reactionary character far exceeding its literal meaning and carrying real reactionary political effect. Ren Jiyu held that Buddhism is an idealist religious system, deploying idealist theoretical argument in the service of faith; at the same time, he acknowledged Buddhism's logical rigor and its rich dialectical thought, regarding it as a repository of intellectual resources still worth excavating. Buddhism, from its very beginnings, employed the analysis of sensation, concept, and material property to construct its religious idealist system, and its methods of argument were highly refined; yet Buddhist dialectical thought is ultimately incompatible with its idealist system, since idealism must, in the end, undermine dialectics. Buddhism's role in the history of philosophy is therefore that of "a teacher by negative example" (反面教员) — that is, "through the critique of Buddhist idealism, it advanced the deepening of Chinese materialism."

Compared with Hou Wailu and Ren Jiyu, Fan Wenlan held a far more radical attitude toward Buddhism, and may be considered an extreme case of anti-Buddhist sentiment in the modern period. On Buddhism in general, Fan Wenlan held that Buddhism, together with its scriptures and doctrines, was riddled with lies and undeserving of serious treatment. He wrote:

:Of all religions, none surpasses Buddhism in the skill and audacity of its lying. (15) Buddhist scriptures are full of lies, and no Buddhist scripture ought ever to be taken seriously — they can only be treated as vain discourse (戏论) and rejected with contempt. Anyone who falls into this great deception may subjectively wish to be a devout, precept-observing Buddhist, but is objectively a great pest, spreading vain discourse and bringing ruin upon the state and calamity upon the people. (16)

Fan Wenlan subjected the various schools of Buddhism to equally thoroughgoing criticism, holding that "the Pure Land school is the easiest path to Buddhahood, but also the school that deceives and harms the most people"; that "the Yogācāra school is even more trivial, a form of vain discourse unworthy of serious treatment"; that "once Buddhism evolved into Tantric Buddhism, it degenerated into witchcraft, bewitching and deceiving the world through occult arts, and Buddhism reached a dead end"; and that the Huayan school, "whether partial or complete, amounts to nothing but empty fancy and empty talk, devoid of practical significance — fundamentally a set of deceptive tricks in loyal service to the ruling class." Fan Wenlan's critique of Buddhism employed the Marxist method of class analysis: Buddhism, he held, was indeed a great scourge for the oppressed classes, because

:Buddhism emphasizes karmic retribution, using it to explain class inequality and the immense gulf separating rich and poor, which benefits the ruling class enormously and has thus earned it the protection and patronage of rulers. Compounding this, it is riddled with lies and exaggerations, threatening people with the endless suffering of hell and enticing them with rewards of wealth a thousandfold greater. The oppressed people cannot help but be deceived by it, and those who are especially covetous are all the more liable to be ensnared, deceived unto death and unable to free themselves — becoming devout Buddhists who do not mean to deceive, yet are deceivers in practice. (17)

It is difficult to say to what extent such radical criticism accords with the basic ideas of Marxism, or with the historical reality of Buddhism. Mao Zedong himself once held that "Buddhism speaks for the oppressed." In my own view, there is a Buddhism that represents the interests of the landlord class, and a Buddhism that represents the interests of ordinary people; there is no Buddhism that serves the landlord class alone. Even within the landlord class itself, attitudes toward Buddhism were never uniform. And from the standpoint of Buddhist doctrine, a Buddhism that served only the interests of one particular class would forfeit its very value of "delivering all sentient beings." Tibetan Buddhism is a Buddhism organized from the top down; Huineng's Chan is a popular, or plebeian, Buddhism. Fan Wenlan's disregard for this historical complexity makes his wholesale rejection of Buddhism something of an anomaly in the history of Chinese thought. Lin Zhenguo (林镇国) observes:

:Generally speaking, Chinese Marxists' compilation and interpretation of the Buddhist heritage were conducted entirely according to the principles of historical materialism, holding that religion and philosophy are superstructural products reflecting economic and political structures, and that historically — whether in China or India — Buddhist religion and philosophy served the feudal landlord class. This is the Marxist programme of Buddhist critique that has guided, without exception, the writing of histories of Chinese philosophy and Buddhism since 1949.

:The Marxist critique of Buddhism is one component of their broader ideological critique. For them, Buddhism's role as a defender of the ruling class in Chinese history lay chiefly in its proposal of an idealist ontology, which "attempts, through speculative means, to demonstrate a so-called ontology lurking behind the objective world, thereby rendering the reality of existence illusory, and even defining it as the externalization of self-consciousness or a reflection of thought." This "ontology" is referred to in Chinese Buddhism as "ultimate truth" (真谛), "mind" (心), "consciousness" (识), "dharma-nature" (法性), and so on. How to realize this ontology, and merge with it, becomes the goal of religious practice in Chinese Buddhism — a practice that is the subject's return to its own origin, or ontology; hence, within the ontology of Buddhist idealism, subject and ontology are held to have originally been one and the same. (18)

After the 1980s, Chinese Marxist attitudes toward Buddhism changed considerably. On the one hand, extreme and simplistic class analysis gradually fell out of favor, and more scholars came to weigh the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of Buddhist philosophy from the perspective of the history of human knowledge; the dualist opposition of materialism and idealism remained in use, but the complexity of history and thought was increasingly acknowledged. On the other hand, some began to draw on certain elements of Buddhism as resources for constructing a Sinicized Marxist philosophy. Take, for example, the eminent Marxist historian of philosophy Feng Qi (冯契). As a historian of philosophy, Feng Qi, in his ''Logical Development of Ancient Chinese Philosophy'' (中国古代哲学的逻辑发展), still employed the materialist–idealist framework, arguing, for instance, that the various schools of Sui–Tang Buddhism each subjected different facets of "mind" to close scrutiny in the service of idealism, and that the opposition between the Faxiang school's (法相宗) theory of "consciousness-only" and the Huayan school's theory of "dependent origination of the dharma-realm" (法界缘起) represented a contrast between empiricist and rationalist forms of idealism. As a philosopher, however, Feng Qi's doctrine of "transforming consciousness into wisdom" (转识成智), grounded in Marxist practical materialism yet incorporating elements of traditional Chinese philosophy, constructed a systematic account of wisdom in which the influence of Chan and Yogācāra is unmistakable — demonstrating the value Buddhist thought can hold for the construction of a Sinicized Marxist philosophy. I believe Feng Qi has here raised a topic well worth further study.