Editing Thailand (section)

== Radical Buddhism in Thailand ==

The reformed Buddhist worldview's earliest political effects were, paradoxically, conservative rather than progressive: the ''phu mi bun'' ("persons having merit") movements of 1901–1902 in northeastern Thailand, and the resistance led by Khruba Srivijaya in the north during the 1920s and 1930s, represented millenarian attempts to restore an older cosmological order that royal reform had destabilized. Though ultimately suppressed, these episodes demonstrated that reformed Buddhism had already unsettled traditional legitimations of power well before any organized progressive movement emerged to fill the resulting vacuum.

=== Institutional Reform and State Repression: Phra Phimontham ===

Phra Phimontham (born Aat Duangmala, 1901–1980s) is not a "radical Buddhist" figure in the project's left-wing sense — his project was the democratization of sangha governance, not the fusion of Buddhism with socialist or Marxist politics — but his case is historically indispensable to understanding what activist Buddhism was up against. The first major figure to translate reformed religious consciousness into a demand for structural change within the sangha's own governance, Phimontham rose through the Mahanikay Order to become abbot of Bangkok's Wat Mahathat and, by 1949, its senior administrator; he promoted popular meditation practice, sent monks abroad for study, and was widely expected to become the sangha's supreme patriarch. His progressive reputation made him a target of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's authoritarian government: stripped of ecclesiastical office in 1960 and disrobed and charged with communism in 1963 — a charge with no real ideological basis, but a convenient one for a government seeking to discredit a popular reformer — he was ultimately acquitted in 1966. His prosecution nonetheless served, in Keyes's assessment, as a durable warning against drawing on Buddhism to mount any critical stance toward the existing political order — a warning that would not go unheeded until the crisis of the 1970s.

The October 1973 student uprising that toppled Thailand's military government opened a five-year period of intense ideological contest. Secular socialist politics, drawing on Western leftist thought, initially dominated among students and intellectuals but failed to secure electoral support; when a 1976 coup crushed the civilian government, many activists fled to the jungle to join the Communist Party of Thailand. By 1978, however, this secular insurgency had largely collapsed, its recruits alienated and drawn back by government amnesty, and — in Keyes's phrase — many returned instead to "the roots of indigenous revolutionary thought" in the nineteenth-century Buddhist reformation.<ref>Keyes, Charles F. (1987). ''Thailand: Buddhist Kingdom as Modern Nation-State''. Westview Press, p. [TK].</ref> Ironically, the state's own anti-communist and missionary programs among hill peoples during the Sarit and Thanom governments had already normalized the idea that Buddhism could supply a moral rationale for political action — a precedent the state itself could not, once established, fully contain.

=== Militant Anticommunism: Kittivuddho Bhikkhu ===

Kittivuddho Bhikkhu is included here as a contrast case rather than as a "radical Buddhist" in the project's ordinary left-wing sense — his politics were avowedly right-wing, nationalist, and militantly anticommunist — but, like Pol Pot in the Cambodia profile, he is too historically consequential to omit. Through his Cittabhavana College, Kittivuddho trained monks for active social and political roles, and after 1973 became notorious for declaring that killing communists incurred no karmic demerit, on the grounds that communists were not "complete persons." Though never adopted as official state policy, his rhetoric reshaped the character of Thai political discourse and anticipated the later, more institutionalized Buddhist nationalism discussed below. His case illustrates that reformed Buddhism's emphasis on individual moral agency proved just as available to reactionary mobilization as to progressive activism.

A related but distinct current of right-leaning activism emerged at Wat Thammakai, founded in 1970 and built around a distinctive meditation method involving concentration on a visualized crystal sphere. The movement's evangelical style, strict ascetic retreats, and appeal to educated urban Thais gave it real political weight by the mid-1980s, when it briefly attracted the patronage of Army Commander-in-Chief Arthit Kamlengek.

=== Buddhadasa Bhikkhu and Dhammic Socialism ===
{{Main|Buddhadasa Bhikkhu}}

On the doctrinal left stood Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (1906–1993), Thailand's most influential modern Buddhist theologian. From his forest monastery at Suan Mokkh, Buddhadasa developed the concept of ''thammika sangkhomniyom'', or "Dhammic Socialism," which held that socialism was the natural state of existence — a condition of interdependent parts taking only what they required, disrupted by humanity's departure from natural balance through the accumulation of surplus. His model depended on a ''dhammaraja'', a righteous, virtue-possessed monarch who would redistribute wealth voluntarily rather than through coercive state mechanisms. The Thai scholar Preecha Changkhwanyuen subjected this synthesis to a sustained critique, arguing that it rested on a romanticized reading of nature, an unrealistic faith in voluntary redistribution, and no workable account of how a sufficiently virtuous ruler might be identified, trained, or removed. Despite these theoretical difficulties, Buddhadasa's thought proved immensely influential, supplying much of the intellectual vocabulary for the socially engaged Buddhist NGO sector that emerged in Thailand from the late 1970s onward. The Buddhadasa–Preecha debate over Dhammic Socialism is substantial enough to merit separate, fuller treatment; only its essential contours are summarized here.

=== Sulak Sivaraksa and Transnational Engaged Buddhism ===
{{Main|Sulak Sivaraksa}}

Sulak Sivaraksa (b. 1933), a lay intellectual influenced by Buddhadasa but operating outside the monastic establishment, translated doctrinal radicalism into organized transnational activism. His founding of the International Network of Engaged Buddhists in 1989 linked Buddhist social activists across Asia, and his sustained criticism of the alliance between the Thai military, monarchy, and sangha establishment resulted in repeated charges of ''lèse-majesté'' and periods of exile. Where Phimontham had sought institutional reform and Buddhadasa doctrinal reinterpretation, Sulak mobilized Buddhism directly as a resource for organized social movements.

=== Ascetic Fundamentalism: Santi Asoke and Chamlong Srimuang ===

Founded by Phra Bodhirak in 1975 and rejected as heretical by the mainstream sangha, the Santi Asoke movement organizes strict vegetarian, ascetic communes that reject consumer capitalism outright — a communal, self-sufficient economics that borders on the project's leftward concerns even though the movement itself is not socialist or Marxist in any doctrinal sense. Its political significance became evident in 1985, when Major-General Chamlong Srimuang, a Santi Asoke adherent known for his austere personal discipline, won a landslide election as governor of Bangkok, credited by Keyes to his image as a moral alternative to both military rule and parliamentary corruption. Chamlong is not a "radical Buddhist" figure in the project's left-wing sense, but his case remains useful evidence that Buddhist fundamentalist asceticism, and not only doctrinal or institutional radicalism, could translate into effective mass-scale political mobilization.

=== The Ambiguity of Reformed Buddhist Politics ===

Taken together, these trajectories demonstrate that Thai Buddhist activism has never been uniformly progressive. The same reformed emphasis on individual ethical agency that enabled Buddhadasa's Dhammic Socialism and Sulak's transnational activism also enabled Kittivuddho's militant anticommunism and, later, an explicitly nationalist Buddhist politics. This ambiguity is constitutive of the reformation's legacy rather than incidental to it.

=== Contemporary Developments ===

The 2020–2021 pro-democracy protests brought a new generation of monks into demonstrations calling for constitutional reform, curbs on monarchical power, and — significantly — the sangha's own removal from state administrative control; a visible faction became known informally as the "Carrot Gang" for their orange robes. State and sangha-hierarchy repression of participating monks, exemplified by the case of the novice Saharat Sukkhamla, who was pressured into disrobing after being charged with royal defamation, echoes the treatment of Phimontham six decades earlier. Meanwhile, organizational descendants of the 1970s and 1980s engaged Buddhist movement, including Sulak's International Network of Engaged Buddhists and Phra Paisal Visalo's Sekiyadhamma network, continue work on environmental, gender-justice, and public-health issues.

Running counter to this progressive current, a resurgent Buddhist nationalism — flagged here, as with Kittivuddho above, as material outside this project's left-wing scope but retained as necessary contrast — has gained institutional traction since the 2014 military coup, which added a specific Theravada Buddhist protection clause to the 2017 constitution and subjected the Dhammakaya movement, perceived as politically aligned with the deposed Thaksin Shinawatra government, to an armed 2017 siege of its main temple. Whether this material eventually warrants its own contextual article, in the manner of a foil to the project's ordinary subject matter, is left as an open editorial question rather than decided here.