Editing SG31SBE-T (section)

== Part Three ==

=== Is Poverty the Result of Previous-Life Karma? ===
'''B:''' Then how exactly have doctrines such as “karmic cause and recompense” been distorted so as to perform the function of religion in the service of established power?

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'''A:''' Let’s begin with “karmic cause and recompense.” As I said earlier, Buddhism is neither fatalism, creationism, nor a doctrine of chance. Of course Buddhism teaches the law of cause and effect, so differences between rich and poor certainly have causes. The distortion lies in placing the cause entirely on one side and thereby imposing resignation and submission. Take the proletarian masses who remain poor no matter how hard they work. How have priests traditionally explained the cause of their poverty? “It is karma from a previous existence. It is your own karma and your own recompense. It is neither the capitalist’s fault nor society’s responsibility. Therefore, instead of blaming capitalists or society, you should simply work even harder.” That is how they have solemnly explained it.

But anyone with even a little knowledge of the capitalist system can already see through such an explanation; there is hardly any need to belabor the point. Last year’s so-called “bumper-crop hell” is an excellent example. The weather was favorable and the farmers labored until the sweat poured from them, yet that unprecedented bumper crop actually became a cause of increased hardship for farming households. Can that fact really be disposed of through a doctrine of causation from a previous life? Or look at bank interest rates: small borrowers are charged more, while large borrowers receive more favorable rates, pushing the small borrower into an increasingly disadvantageous position. Or consider the grossly unequal distribution of profits generated through the cooperation of labor and capital, and the suppression by governmental authority of those who protest. If economic inequality is produced by such unfair social causes, can all of it really be dismissed as the poor person’s karmic consequence from a former existence?

=== Poverty Is Also a Matter of Collective Responsibility ===
'''A:''' Buddhist reasoning does not permit such one-sidedness. In this case Buddhism clearly asserts social “joint responsibility” (rentai sekinin, 連帯責任); it does not assign responsibility to one side alone. This is what Buddhism means by “collective karma, collectively experienced” (gūgō shokan 共業所感).<ref>Gūgō shokan 共業所感 refers to the collective experience of conditions arising from “shared karma” (gūgō 共業), in contrast to karmic consequences attributed solely to an individual’s actions. Seno’o invokes the concept here to reinterpret karma socially: poverty and economic inequality are not simply the individual karmic responsibility of the poor but conditions collectively produced and therefore entailing collective responsibility.</ref> ''If responsibility is joint, then capitalists too must bear part of the responsibility for the impoverished lives of the proletarian masses. More broadly, it is a responsibility shared by society as a whole. Once we discover that defects in the capitalist economic system are among the causes of poverty, shouldn’t reform of that system become the first question confronting us as a matter of joint responsibility?''

'''B:''' But if that is so, how should we understand such ideas as “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense” (jigō jitoku, 自業自得) and “cause and effect through the three existences” (sanze inga, 三世因果)? Are you saying there is absolutely no individual responsibility…

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…at all?

'''A:''' I am not saying that individual responsibility does not exist. The question is whether responsibility is confined to an individual’s private life or whether the transformation of society is regarded as fundamental. We cannot determine which is fundamental without correctly understanding the relationship between the individual and society.

Now, in “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense,” an individual self is posited, and the actions it performs through the cycle of rebirth are described as “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense” or “cause and effect through the three existences.” But so long as no-self is a fundamental principle of Buddhism, this way of thinking must naturally be re-examined.

For if we assert an individualistic doctrine of “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense,” Buddhism’s fundamental principle collapses; while if we assert no-self, “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense” cannot stand in that form. In this connection, a scholar named Rhys Davids is said to have explained that “the view current at the time”—the individualistic theory of karmic causation through the three existences—“was added to the teachings of original Buddhism without being logically integrated into them.”<ref>T. W. Rhys Davids (1843–1922), a pioneering British scholar of Pāli Buddhism who emphasized the tension between the Buddhist denial of an enduring self and the doctrine of karmic continuity across successive lives, describing the latter not as transmigration of a soul but as the “transmigration of character.” Seno’o draws upon this historical-critical interpretation to argue that an individualistic doctrine of karmic recompense was not fully consistent with Buddhism’s fundamental teaching of no-self.</ref> I suspect that is indeed the case.

=== The True Liberation of Humanity and Religion ===
The idea of “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense” was a transitional conception belonging to an age in which individuality was exaggerated at the expense of sociality. Buddhism’s fundamental principle, however, remains no-self, together with “the conjunction of many conditions; no single cause produces anything” (shuen wagō, ichiin hishō, 衆縁和合・一因非生).<ref>Shuen wagō 衆縁和合 (“the conjunction of manifold conditions”) expresses the Buddhist principle that phenomena arise through the convergence of multiple causes and conditions rather than through an isolated cause. The principle is developed extensively in Madhyamaka literature, including Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Chūron 中論; T 30, no. 1564) and the Dazhidulun 大智度論 (T 25, no. 1509). Seno’o invokes it against an individualistic interpretation of jigō jitoku 自業自得 (“one’s own karma, one’s own recompense”), arguing that poverty must be understood in relation to social and economic conditions rather than attributed solely to an individual’s past karma. He thereby develops no-self (muga 無我) and dependent arising into principles of collective responsibility and structural social reform.</ref> Consequently, an individualistic theory of jigō jitoku cannot stand. If “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense” is properly interpreted, the “self” in that expression is not an isolated individual ego but a social self—a greater self—formed through the conjunction of causes and conditions. The causes of poverty must therefore be explained socially as well. Accordingly, the means of eliminating those causes should also be sought through positive and concrete social methods. And although society as a whole bears joint responsibility, so long as there remains a distinction between ruler and ruled, it is only reasonable that a greater share of responsibility be sought from the ruling class. To treat poverty simply as the proletarian’s “own karma and own recompense,” making individuals resign themselves, submit, sweat away at their labor, and be exploited for the gratification of the ruling class—could there be a more grotesque inversion of right and wrong on the part of priests? ''Therefore, ''jigō jitoku'' must be reconsidered through the Buddhist teaching of no-self. We must be liberated from the distinction between “self” and “other,” and through the true spirit of no-self seek a thoroughgoing, concrete social movement directed toward resolving the problem as a whole. Especially under a modern capitalist system organized as thoroughly as ours, surely it is here that the true liberation of humanity is to be found…''

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…and this is what it means to be a Buddha: a human being who attains such an awakening and then strives vigorously to realize it in society. The Buddha was precisely the exemplary embodiment of such a human personality.

'''B:''' I see. Explained that way, the statement I once heard attributed to the abbot of Zōjōji—that “the fundamental solution to the problem of labor and capital is to make workers understand the law of karmic causation”—really is, quite literally, an opiate sermon.

'''A:''' Exactly. And even if we interpret jigō jitoku in the traditional, individualistic way, such preaching amounts to nothing more than the self-indictment of utterly heartless pseudo-religious figures. For if the poverty suffered by workers is the consequence of causes from a previous life, then surely the difficulties capitalists experience when confronted by strikes of the proletarian masses must likewise be consequences of causes from a previous life. And if the same law of cause and effect applies in both cases, then rather than using it to make proletarians who presently lack material necessities submit and endure, how much more in keeping with the Buddha’s path of saving the weak would it be to use that blessed law of cause and effect to persuade the bourgeoisie, who possess more than enough, to satisfy the demands of the proletarian masses? Even from a practical standpoint, surely there is a far greater possibility of solving the problem by persuading those with abundant material goods simply to give some of them up than by trying to persuade masses who presently lack even bread. And yet in reality precisely the opposite occurs. Isn’t that astonishing?

'''B:''' Exactly. Isn’t this what Lenin meant when he said:

Religion teaches those who toil and suffer throughout their lives to be submissive and patient here on earth, consoling them with the hope of reward in heaven. But to those who live by the labor of others, it teaches charity while they are on earth, thus offering them a very cheap way of justifying their entire existence as exploiters and selling them tickets to heavenly bliss at a moderate price. <ref>V. I. Lenin, “Socialism and Religion” (1905), originally published in Novaya Zhizn, no. 28 (December 3, 1905); see Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 10, pp. 83–87. Seno’o’s wording reflects the Japanese translation available to him rather than corresponding exactly to later English translations.</ref>

But there is one thing I still wonder about. If responsibility is located socially in this way, won’t individual effort become weaker?

'''A:''' People accustomed to the kind of individualistic social life we have today may easily think so. But in reality, the more thoroughly a consciousness of belonging to a community with shared interests takes hold, the more strongly individual effort is intensified. Anyone who has committed himself wholeheartedly to a genuine communal life knows this from experience.

''Every pioneer worthy of respect has been someone who saw the whole of society within himself and understood himself in relation to social life. Such people could not help but engage in social action. ''The Buddha’s rejection of the individual ego and private possession, and his teaching of our indebtedness to society, arose from precisely this…

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…reason. And far from being misguided, were not the efforts of Marx and Lenin—who maintained that “the human essence is the totality of social relations”—magnificent?<ref>Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” Thesis VI (1845): “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” Seno’o invokes the formulation to reinforce his reinterpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of no-self in explicitly social terms.</ref> Individual self-interest is, of course, also part of ordinary human nature, and in that sense “one’s own karma, one’s own recompense” is undoubtedly a transitional mode of thought rooted in that aspect of human nature. ''But the truth of no-self points eternally toward humanity’s highest liberation and toward a life of common production and common flourishing.''

=== The Distorted Doctrine of “Differentiation Is Precisely Equality” ===
'''A:''' Next comes the distorted doctrine of “differentiation is precisely equality.” Here too, as you said earlier with the expression “flowers are red, willows are green,” priests have devised clever explanations designed to make people accept irrational and unjust social inequalities exactly as they are.<ref>“Differentiation is precisely equality” (shabetsu soku byōdō 差別即平等) is a conventional Buddhist formulation, particularly associated with Tiantai and Huayan (J. Kegon) thought, expressing the nondual relation between the equality of phenomena and their particular differences. Rather than a quotation from a single classical text, the formula summarizes such doctrines as Tiantai’s perfect interpenetration of the Three Truths and Huayan’s interpenetration of identity and difference. Seno’o attacks conservative interpretations of this principle that treat existing differences of wealth and social position as natural or religiously sanctioned. “Willows are green, flowers are red” (yanagi wa midori, hana wa kurenai 柳緑花紅), a phrase common in Zen discourse, similarly evokes things as they are in their particularity. Seno’o attacks conservative interpretations of such formulas that treat existing differences of wealth and social position as natural or religiously sanctioned. For him, inequalities produced by social and economic institutions cannot be equated with natural differences such as the colors of flowers and leaves.</ref>

'''B:''' But as you yourself have often said, if a flowerpot requiring seven gō of water receives seven gō, and one requiring three gō receives three, neither has too much nor too little.<ref>Gō 合 is a traditional Japanese unit of volume equal to one-tenth of a shō 升, or approximately 180 milliliters. Seno’o uses the proportion of seven gō to three gō to illustrate a conception of equity—distribution according to differing needs—rather than rigid numerical equality.</ref> Isn’t that “differentiation is precisely equality”—a natural differentiation rather than an unjust one?

'''A:''' As far as that explanation goes, it is perfectly correct. Five gō is insufficient for someone who needs seven, while five is too much for someone who needs three. The one who needs seven should receive seven, and the one who needs three should receive three. But are the differences in present society really arranged in that way? A poor family of seven may be crammed into a three-tatami-mat tenement, suffering because they do not even have enough rice for today’s meal. Meanwhile, another couple may live spaciously in an enormous mansion, possessing more wealth than they could ever use and idling away their time in amusements.

A poor old man may be jostled about in third class on a train, while a wealthy young man sits grandly in second class. An ordinary laborer may work throughout the day for a daily wage of barely two yen, while someone else puts in an appearance at the company for four or five hours and pockets several hundred yen. A bright, physically capable child may be unable to proceed to higher education simply because there is no money, while elsewhere even a frail child of little ability can find some way through the examination ordeal. Present society is certainly not differentiated according to need in the way you described—seven gō to the person who needs seven and three to the person who needs three.

=== How Is True Equality to Be Realized? ===
'''B:''' But although these inequalities may at first look like nothing more than the selfishness of the wealthy, haven’t the wealthy made the effort necessary to become wealthy? Couldn’t those differences therefore be regarded as legitimate distinctions corresponding to differences in effort?

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'''A:''' If human society were no different from the competitive life of plants and animals—the strong devouring the weak in the struggle for survival—then I would have no objection to such differences. But insofar as human beings are beings possessed of personality, the differences within human society must themselves be ordered in a manner worthy of human personality. Otherwise, they cannot properly be called the differentiations of human society. Take the example we just used. If a two-person household receives six gō of rice, then a seven-person household should receive two shō and one gō. If a train has second- and third-class accommodation, then perhaps the elderly and children should ride second class, while young people ride third. If someone working two hour receives four yen, then someone working six hours should receive twelve. There would still be differences, but they would not simply be differences produced as the outcome of free competition. That, I think, is what “differentiation is precisely equality” ought to mean in human life. Moreover, as I said earlier, if poverty is not merely a matter of jigō jitoku but a matter of social joint responsibility, then wealth too must be regarded not simply as an individual’s own karmic reward but as something social. A person’s wealth therefore ought not to be used freely and arbitrarily for that person alone. Should not the genuine “differentiation that is precisely equality” of human society consist instead in differences rationally and purposively ordered under social regulation?

Yet on the one hand people loudly proclaim mutual aid and harmony between labor and capital, while on the other, religious figures in the service of established power preach that the differences produced by heartless, ruthless free competition are somehow the absolute truth of “differentiation is precisely equality.” What kind of gospel is that? Just think about it. The many spend their entire lives breaking their bodies in dark mine shafts extracting gold and silver, while the few freely appropriate that gold and silver and spend their lives in luxury. If we simply say that this too is the result of free competition, there is nothing more to discuss. But to take mastery of life and transform instinct into rational, purposive action—to make the world into a consciously ordered product—this is humanity’s task. If that is so, surely it is utterly irrational simply to contemplate these inequalities as they are and call them “differentiation is precisely equality.” Human society is not merely a natural phenomenon. ''It is a society endowed with reason and creative power. Therefore, insofar as this is possible, should not the phrase “differentiation is precisely equality” mean consciously using reason to order differences and thereby create the greatest practicable degree of equality?''

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=== Free Competition and Cooperative Harmony ===
'''B:''' But competitiveness is also part of human nature. Wouldn’t such an ideal society ultimately be nothing more than a fantasy? And if we impose a strong order upon society, might the result not instead be the mass production of idlers?

'''A:''' That is a concern one commonly hears. But just as human beings possess a capacity for competition, they also clearly possess a capacity for harmony. Indeed, it is precisely this capacity for harmony—this sociality—that is characteristic of human beings. Unfortunately, we have not yet attained a form of organized life in which it can be sufficiently cultivated and developed.

Consider the early stages of human evolution. Human beings did not possess the sharp and powerful weapons found naturally in other animals—fangs, claws, and the like. In the natural struggle for survival, therefore, they were at an extreme disadvantage. ''Why, despite this, were they able to become masters of the earth? Was it not because they possessed reason and creative power, and because they lived lives of cooperation and solidarity? If that is so, individual free competition cannot be the primary principle of human society; the primary principle must instead be the sociality of cooperation and harmony. Only within such a conscious society can individual freedom itself be guaranteed and established. This rational mode of existence, I believe, is both the distinctive characteristic and the destiny of humanity. ''

We can understand this quite well simply by considering the course of an individual human life.

From infancy through childhood we may be innocent, but we are virtually self-interest embodied as instinct. At no other stage do we wield the instinct of self-interest so unrestrainedly. Yet as the sphere of life expands from the family to school, and from school to society, self-control increases, we become more social, and as we enter old age we grow increasingly mature. Looking at the facts, I believe that the history of human society will probably develop in much the same way: with the development of reason, it will advance toward an ideal society. Unfortunately, however, present society is still entangled in the net of a capitalist economic system woven by instinctive free competition. It may therefore seem that if economic competition were abolished, life itself would lose its purpose. ''But competition need not be confined to economics. On the contrary, scientific…''

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''…artistic, moral, and other forms of competition will surely bring about an age of true competition worthy of humanity. ''At present, however, all the diverse capacities of human beings have been driven down the single path of economic competition and, grotesquely, have themselves been turned into commodities. We have become so accustomed to this that we have even constructed the conceptual formula “human life = economic life.” Consequently, even if people’s livelihoods were guaranteed, we imagine that without economic free competition they would lose all capacity for activity—like a morphine addict deprived of morphine. But I don’t believe that. On the contrary, I believe that it is precisely when we are liberated from economic competition that the true stage of human life will finally open before us. Take manual labor, for example. If it were socially planned and distributed equally, workers and farmers who have traditionally suffered from overwork would of course be relieved of that burden. At the same time, appropriate work could be assigned to those members of society who had previously passed their days in idleness, allowing both groups to enjoy healthy lives in body and mind.

Yet today, while ordinary people have no rice for tomorrow and go hungry, the government has some four million koku of surplus rice piled up in warehouses and does not know what to do with it. In such a merciless and uncoordinated capitalist society, those who work must labor night and day simply to survive. Labor itself therefore comes generally to be hated. But appropriate labor ought, on the contrary, to be a source of joy. ''If appropriate work were available to everyone within a planned society, no one would simply want to be idle. People would come to spend a certain number of hours working less as a social duty than as an enjoyable right.''

Look, for example, at the lives of the people of Ittōen. They obtain only enough food for the day, yet are content with that and work happily throughout the day. Isn’t this evidence that human beings can live contentedly and work without necessarily accumulating private property?

=== The Role of Ittōen at the Present Stage ===
'''B:''' But is that sort of austere life really the ideal form of human life?

'''A:''' Of course I don’t think it is. I doubt that Tenkō-san thinks so either. Buddhism has the expression “ordinary people attached to appearances” (shusō no bonbu). There are those who are inclined to take the outward form of such a life of coarse clothing and simple food as though that itself constituted the ideal life of a sage. I don’t accept that.

''A truly human life…''

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''…I think, demands not only spiritual development but also a material life that is rich, wholesome, and beautiful. ''There is nothing unjust about seeking this. When such a life cannot be enjoyed by everyone, restraint born of compassion for others has meaning. But coarse clothing and simple food have no absolute value in themselves. The history of human development proves this. ''Humanity’s task is not to return to primitive life by cutting itself off from civilization, but rather to advance toward an ever higher form of cultural life.''

'''B:''' Then wouldn’t the ideal be to realize Ittōen’s cooperative life without private property throughout society, but in a materially more advanced cultural form?

'''A:''' Ideally, yes. But Ittōen is, after all, an anomalous form of utopian socialism born under the oppressive conditions of capitalist society. It has significance as a training ground in which intellectually and spiritually troubled people can experience the spirit of non-possession. Yet, viewed objectively in relation to present social conditions, one cannot expect it to function as a practical movement for social reconstruction. On the contrary, I think it has unconsciously come to play something like an opiate-like role.

=== The Proletarian Movement and the Realization of an Ideal Society ===
'''B:''' Then how do you envision the practical movement for realizing such an ideal society?

'''A:''' As I said before, I see no path to reconstruction other than through the political power of the emerging proletarian class, provided that it develops properly.

'''B:''' Legally or illegally?

'''A:''' In principle, I would like it to proceed legally. But I do not believe that what is illegal is necessarily unjust. A commentary on the Nirvāṇa Sutra explains it this way:

Whether monastic or lay, those who would protect the Dharma should take account of the original intention, setting aside the particular act while preserving the principle, and thereby rightly propagate the Great Teaching. Thus, in “protecting and upholding the True Dharma,” one must not be constrained by minor observances. … In former times, when conditions were peaceful and the Dharma flourished, one should have upheld the precepts. Now, in a dangerous age when the Dharma is obscured, one should take up the staff. … Choose and reject according to circumstances; one must not adhere exclusively to a single course.<ref>Seno’o cites Guanding 灌頂 (561–632), Dabanniepan jing shu (大般涅槃經疏; J. Daihatsu Nehangyō Sho, “Commentary on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra”; T 1767), concerning the protection of the True Dharma (shōbō goji 正法護持). The underlying Nirvāṇa Sutra famously permits lay defenders of the Dharma to bear weapons in dangerous circumstances while prohibiting them from taking life. Seno’o uses the commentary to argue that Buddhist ethical action must respond to historical circumstances rather than adhere inflexibly to outward forms, extending this principle here to the possible use of force in pursuit of social transformation.</ref>

''In short, one must not cling to forms.'' ''If the motive is right, then depending on circumstances one may even have to resolve matters through force.'' There is also the saying, “Kill one in order to let ten thousand live.” Thus illegality is not necessarily evil. Whether an act is to be approved should be determined by examining its fundamental motive and the circumstances of the particular case. Japanese history itself provides examples. The reforms of the Meiji Restoration are an obvious case.

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But naturally,'' what I hope for is a transformation that is legal from the outset and involves as little sacrifice as possible. For that to happen, people throughout society must recognize as quickly as possible the evils of capitalist society and the historical necessity of the emergence of the new class, until this becomes common knowledge. By giving the proletarian movement as'' ''much sympathy and support as possible, we can minimize the unavoidable sacrifices accompanying social transformation.''

=== The Anti-Religion Movement and Our Position ===
'''B:''' What exactly is this anti-religion movement that has recently begun as one wing of the proletarian movement?

'''A:''' In fact, just last night I participated in a joint public meeting at the Central Buddhist Hall with Takatsu Seidō of the anti-religion movement, Honjō Kasō, Kon Tōkō, a certain Mr. Miwa, secretary-general of the Buddhist Youth Federation, Shibata Ichinō of the Nichiren school, and others.<ref>This public meeting brought together representatives of the anti-religion movement and several currents of Buddhist reform. Participants included Takatsu Seidō 高津正道 (1893–1974), a socialist activist and politician active in the contemporary anti-religion movement; Kon Tōkō 今東光 (1898–1977), novelist and Tendai monk; Honjō Kasō 本莊可宗 (1891–1987); Mibu Shōjun 壬生照順 (1908–1987), Tendai monk, secretary-general of the All-Japan Buddhist Youth Federation and soon-to-be member of Seno’o’s Youth League; and Nichiren monk Shibata Ichinō 柴田一能 (1873–1951). Akita Ujaku 秋田雨雀 (1883–1962), a playwright and prominent figure in the proletarian cultural movement, served as chairman of the Japan Anti-Religious League (Nihon Han-Shūkyō Dōmei 日本反宗教同盟). According to Seno’o’s account of an article by Akita in the Yomiuri Shimbun, disagreement arose over the movement’s attitude toward the “Social Democrats”: more radical members favored their exclusion, while Takatsu opposed this position and withdrew.</ref> According to Takatsu’s explanation, the basic argument of the anti-religion movement, from his socialist standpoint, is this: “Justice is that which guarantees the welfare of the masses. Anything that obstructs the welfare of the masses must therefore be attacked. Religion is the greatest obstacle to the welfare of the masses because it serves as the watchdog of capitalism. Religion must therefore be attacked.”

'''B:''' Is Takatsu’s position different from that of Akita Ujaku and the League for Anti-Religious Struggle?

'''A:''' According to something Akita wrote in the Yomiuri Shimbun, the issue was the value to be placed on making use of the Social Democrats. The more radical members of the League wanted to exclude them, while Takatsu disagreed and withdrew. But if, as Takatsu explained last night, his anti-religion movement takes justice as its starting point, then theoretically it contains something that cannot be reconciled with pure Marxism. As a practical movement, however, the two are alike insofar as they attack religion as an opiate.

'''B:''' Then what attitude do they take toward your Revitalized Buddhist movement? You too reject capitalism and attack the established religious institutions. Do they attack you as well?

'''A:''' Even though we agree on those points, the anti-religion movement arose from a Marxism that denies religion itself. So naturally they cannot exempt Revitalized Buddhism from their attack.

Indeed, precisely because we are “Red Buddhists,” they may regard us as all the more troublesome.

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For our part, although we likewise reject capitalism and the established religious institutions, so long as our understanding differs from that of Marxism, we cannot simply throw ourselves wholesale into Marxism. ''But this is no different from the fact that, even though they belong to the same anti-religion movement, differences between Akita and Takatsu have unfortunately produced a split between them. ''The fundamental issue, therefore, must be a critique of Marxism itself—particularly its conception of religion.

In his Feuerbach, Engels writes: “If religion can exist without God, then alchemy can exist without the philosopher’s stone.”

And: “Nothing exists outside nature and humanity. The higher beings created by our religious fantasies are nothing other than the fantastic reflection of our own essence.”<ref>Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886), especially sections II–III. Engels there discusses Feuerbach’s critique of theism, according to which the supernatural beings of religion are projections or “fantastic reflections” of human beings themselves, while criticizing Feuerbach’s attempt to preserve a non-theistic “religion”: “if religion can exist without its God, then alchemy can exist without its philosopher’s stone.” The work circulated in prewar Japan as Foierubahha ron (フォイエルバッハ論). Seno’o uses Engels’s argument to distinguish the Marxist critique of theistic religion from Buddhism, which he argues requires no creator, ruling, or judging God.</ref>

With this, the spell was broken. The Marxist conception of religion represented in this passage is, after all, a response to the Christian creator God. If the essence of religion consisted in believing in the actual existence of such a God, then we too would deny religion along with Marx. Why? Because Buddhism did not arise by acknowledging anything like a “creator God, ruling God, or judging God.” ''Moreover, since Buddhism has undeniably existed as a religion, religion as such cannot be something that must simply be rejected. Established religious institutions that exploit the masses, of course, may be rejected—and indeed ought to be rejected. I doubt that anyone desires their rejection more strongly than we do. Precisely for that reason, we respect the ideal of the anti-religion movement insofar as it is motivated by concern for the masses.''

But suppose that, as expressed in the aspiration “I desire only to become a Buddha,” we understand religiosity as the whole-person demand that ceaselessly seeks the ideal of the complete human being—the Buddha. Then the various sectarian forms found in established religions are simply forms in which this religiosity has been conceived at different stages of cultural development. Those established religious institutions must naturally undergo the appropriate historical reckoning demanded by their age. ''But a movement that denies religiosity itself reveals, on the contrary, an inadequate understanding of human life. What we should demand is a religion appropriate to the age. In this sense, should not the anti-religion movement itself be properly sublated? Needless to say, if religion is to be rejected wholesale because it obstructs the welfare of the masses, that judgment can properly apply only to established religious institutions.''

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''The essence of religion itself emphatically does not run counter to the welfare of the masses. ''The Buddha and Christ are obvious examples. Lincoln’s movement for the emancipation of slaves provides another striking one. Is not religiosity itself the source of the great ideal of mutual love among the masses and of the passionate energy required to put that ideal into practice?

'''B:''' I understand much better now. On May 23, the League for Anti-Religious Struggle is holding its inaugural lecture meeting at the Jichikan in Ueno, and apparently your movement will be criticized there too. After I’ve heard what they have to say, I’d like to ask your opinion again.

'''A:''' I’d like to hear it myself, but unfortunately I have to attend the Kanazawa branch meeting on the twenty-third, so I can’t go. Listen carefully for me. ''If by any chance there is even the slightest error in my convictions, I will never hesitate to stop this movement. ''Nichiren said:'' ''“Even if I am defeated in argument, if my mind does not change, may the gods take my life.” But he also said: “If my doctrine is refuted by a wise person, I will not use it.”'' ''It is in this spirit that I want to press forward single-mindedly with the Revitalized Buddhist movement.'' ''Blind faith is no good.

=== Rational Religion and Reverence for Śākyamuni Buddha ===
'''B:''' But isn’t precisely that attitude the genuinely religious attitude? Rational religion! Isn’t the very motive force behind humanity’s limitless capacity for renewal precisely this rational religiosity?

'''A:''' ''When we desire this kind of rational passion, we are necessarily drawn in reverence toward humanity’s highest exemplar, Śākyamuni Buddha. And when we revere Śākyamuni Buddha, this rational passion that we cannot cease desiring naturally burns still more intensely.'' Thus reason calmly subjects problems to criticism, while passion drives us directly toward the realization of the ideal, even at the risk of death. The scripture says: “Single-mindedly desiring to see the Buddha, they do not begrudge their own lives.” And elsewhere: “Because their hearts yearn for him, he then appears and preaches the Dharma for them.”<ref>Seno’o brings together two statements by Nichiren with two passages from the Lotus Sutra. “Even if I am defeated in argument...” derives from Nichiren’s Hōō-shō 法王抄, 1267 (Shōwa Teihon, vol. 1, p. 438), while “If my doctrine is refuted by a wise person...” is from the Kaimoku-shō 開目抄, 1272 (Shōwa Teihon, vol. 1, p. 572). The scriptural passages—“single-mindedly desiring to see the Buddha, they do not begrudge their own lives”) and “because their hearts yearn for him ... he then appears and preaches the Dharma”)—are from chapter 16 of the Lotus Sutra, “The Life Span of the Thus Come One” (Nyorai Juryō-hon 如来寿量品第十六; T 9, no. 262, 43c). Seno’o juxtaposes Nichiren’s insistence on rational scrutiny with the Lotus Sutra’s language of passionate devotion to articulate his ideal of a “rational religion” (gōriteki shūkyō 合理的宗教) combining critical inquiry with commitment to realizing the Buddhist ideal.</ref> These too must surely be confessions of precisely this kind of religious experience. In any event, this is how our Revitalized Buddhist movement becomes a religious movement that unifies the whole of life within reverence for the person of Śākyamuni Buddha.

'''B:''' I think I now more or less understand what you mean by your “conversion to Revitalized Buddhism.”

'''A:''' Then let’s bring this conversation to a close for now and promise to talk again another time.

(Shōwa 6 [1931], “''Under the Banner of Revitalized Buddhism'',” June issue)

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