Lajos at 23:44, 8 October 2026

2026-10-08T23:44:25Z

Lajos at 23:33, 8 October 2026

2026-10-08T23:33:22Z

@@ Line 3: / Line 3: @@
 [[Ichikawa Hakugen]] 市川白弦 (1949). “Buddhism and the Development of Communist Thought” (''Kyōsanshugi shisō no tenkai to Bukkyō'' 共産主義思想の展開と仏教). ([[IH49KST|Japanese original here]].)
-__NOTOC__
+<div class="noautonum">__TOC__</div>
 == Translation ==

James at 19:00, 8 October 2026

2026-10-08T19:00:11Z

Show changes

James at 18:57, 8 October 2026

2026-10-08T18:57:24Z

James: Created page with "{{DISPLAYTITLE:Ichikawa Hakugen, “Buddhism and the Development of Communist Thought”}} Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦 (1949). “Buddhism and the Development of Communist Thought” (''Kyōsanshugi shisō no tenkai to Bukkyō'' 共産主義思想の展開と仏教). (Japanese original here.) NOTOC {| class="toc" style="margin:0.3em 0 0.1em 0; padding:0.5em 0.8em;" |- | '''Contents''' |- | 1. Translation
&..."

2026-10-08T18:54:04Z

Created page with "{{DISPLAYTITLE:Ichikawa Hakugen, “Buddhism and the Development of Communist Thought”}} Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦 (1949). “Buddhism and the Development of Communist Thought” (''Kyōsanshugi shisō no tenkai to Bukkyō'' 共産主義思想の展開と仏教). (Japanese original here.) __NOTOC__ {| class="toc" style="margin:0.3em 0 0.1em 0; padding:0.5em 0.8em;" |- | '''Contents''' |- | 1. Translation<br /> &..."

Show changes

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:57, 8 October 2026
Line 93:		Line 93:
	True religion is not a religion of mere verbal exposition; it is a religion of practice. But does this mean that one need only go silently about the ordinary activities of wearing one's robes and eating one's meals? When someone asks to hear one's learned views, is behaving as though one were unable to speak really what is meant by the “practice” of a religion of practice?		True religion is not a religion of mere verbal exposition; it is a religion of practice. But does this mean that one need only go silently about the ordinary activities of wearing one's robes and eating one's meals? When someone asks to hear one's learned views, is behaving as though one were unable to speak really what is meant by the “practice” of a religion of practice?

	It is said that genuine religious instruction consists in teaching through one<ref><i>Ishin seppō</i> 以身説法 refers to teaching the Dharma through one’s embodied conduct. Ichikawa insists that such conduct must be informed by historically responsive thought.</ref>'s own person (ishin seppō 以身説法). Yet the “person” or “body” referred to here must be a human body, not the body of a mere animal.		It is said that genuine religious instruction consists in teaching through one<ref><i>Ishin seppō</i> 以身説法 refers to teaching the Dharma through one’s embodied conduct. Ichikawa insists that such conduct must be informed by historically responsive thought.</ref>'s own person (''ishin seppō'' 以身説法). Yet the “person” or “body” referred to here must be a human body, not the body of a mere animal.

	The essential difference between the body of a cat and that of a human being does not lie in the number of legs or the arrangement of their hair. Plato is said to have defined the human being as a “two-legged animal with flat nails,” but the fundamental difference between human beings and other animals is not to be found in such characteristics.		The essential difference between the body of a cat and that of a human being does not lie in the number of legs or the arrangement of their hair. Plato is said to have defined the human being as a “two-legged animal with flat nails,” but the fundamental difference between human beings and other animals is not to be found in such characteristics.

	Rather, it lies in whether there is an inner awareness in the ultimate sense—or, to put it another way, whether there is thought (shisō 思想).		Rather, it lies in whether there is an inner awareness in the ultimate sense—or, to put it another way, whether there is thought (''shisō'' 思想).

	“Man is a thinking reed,” said Pascal.		“Man is a thinking reed,” said Pascal.
Line 117:		Line 117:
	This separation of character and thought, and the resulting deterioration of character, is not simply a consequence of the tendency of ideas themselves to become fixed. It also derives from intellectual inertia or laziness and, at a still deeper level, from self-interested calculations bound up with the individual's social position.		This separation of character and thought, and the resulting deterioration of character, is not simply a consequence of the tendency of ideas themselves to become fixed. It also derives from intellectual inertia or laziness and, at a still deeper level, from self-interested calculations bound up with the individual's social position.

	This is precisely one of the things we call karma (gō 業). When confronted with revolutionary ideas, its rigidity manifests itself in violent passions. The distinctive feature of such passions is an inability to listen to an opponent's arguments, accompanied by an inability to engage in flexible self-criticism.		This is precisely one of the things we call karma (''gō'' 業). When confronted with revolutionary ideas, its rigidity manifests itself in violent passions. The distinctive feature of such passions is an inability to listen to an opponent's arguments, accompanied by an inability to engage in flexible self-criticism.

	Those possessed by such passions fail to recognise that their own violence provokes resistance. Instead, they perceive the resistance of others as violence directed against themselves.		Those possessed by such passions fail to recognise that their own violence provokes resistance. Instead, they perceive the resistance of others as violence directed against themselves.
Line 169:		Line 169:
	It is not enough merely to have nothing to be ashamed of before heaven and earth. The shortcomings of an ethics based on motives are already common knowledge in moral philosophy, yet Buddhist ethics up to now has been permeated by precisely these shortcomings.		It is not enough merely to have nothing to be ashamed of before heaven and earth. The shortcomings of an ethics based on motives are already common knowledge in moral philosophy, yet Buddhist ethics up to now has been permeated by precisely these shortcomings.

	The idea expressed in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra<ref>The reference is to the <i>Vimalakīrti Sūtra</i> 維摩経 and its association of the purity of mind with the purity of the Buddha-land.</ref>—“As the mind becomes pure, so too does the Buddha-land become pure”—is a form of social ethics found throughout Buddhism. At the same time, however, it exemplifies the abstract character of individualistic utopianism<ref>Ichikawa’s Japanese expression is ~~個人的ユートピアニズム (~~<i>kojinteki yūtopianizumu</i>), criticising an account of social reform centred on the purification of isolated individuals.</ref>.		The idea expressed in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra<ref>The reference is to the <i>Vimalakīrti Sūtra</i> 維摩経 and its association of the purity of mind with the purity of the Buddha-land.</ref>—“As the mind becomes pure, so too does the Buddha-land become pure”—is a form of social ethics found throughout Buddhism. At the same time, however, it exemplifies the abstract character of individualistic utopianism<ref>Ichikawa’s Japanese expression is <i>kojinteki yūtopianizumu</i> 個人的ユートピアニズム, criticising an account of social reform centred on the purification of isolated individuals.</ref>.

	Such an idealistic, inward-looking orientation places greater emphasis on changing one's state of mind than on transforming the structures of society. Consequently, it inevitably leads to preaching at the masses.		Such an idealistic, inward-looking orientation places greater emphasis on changing one's state of mind than on transforming the structures of society. Consequently, it inevitably leads to preaching at the masses.
Line 287:		Line 287:
	Why does this breakdown occur? Various explanations may subsequently be offered, but as a matter of immediate awareness, it can only be described as occurring “suddenly.”		Why does this breakdown occur? Various explanations may subsequently be offered, but as a matter of immediate awareness, it can only be described as occurring “suddenly.”

	With this sudden breakdown, two tendencies emerge. On the one hand, the desire for self-preservation appears; on the other, an awareness of mutual aid<ref>The Japanese is ~~相互扶助 (~~<i>sōgo fujo</i>). No direct intellectual borrowing from Kropotkin should be inferred without independent evidence.</ref> arises from sympathy with others of one's own kind.		With this sudden breakdown, two tendencies emerge. On the one hand, the desire for self-preservation appears; on the other, an awareness of mutual aid<ref>The Japanese is <i>sōgo fujo</i> 相互扶助. No direct intellectual borrowing from Kropotkin should be inferred without independent evidence.</ref> arises from sympathy with others of one's own kind.

	The former is not necessarily unhealthy in itself. Indeed, it is one of the driving forces through which living beings have preserved their species, and it provides the very basis for activities of mutual aid.		The former is not necessarily unhealthy in itself. Indeed, it is one of the driving forces through which living beings have preserved their species, and it provides the very basis for activities of mutual aid.
Line 297:		Line 297:
	{{tpage\|272\|original\|IH49KST}}		{{tpage\|272\|original\|IH49KST}}

	an aesthetic world, an unblemished clarity in which pleasure and suffering have not yet become intertwined, a world in which human nature can exist as it truly ought to be. Let us provisionally call this the “intrinsically pure mind” (jishō shōjōshin 自性清浄心).		an aesthetic world, an unblemished clarity in which pleasure and suffering have not yet become intertwined, a world in which human nature can exist as it truly ought to be. Let us provisionally call this the “intrinsically pure mind” (''jishō shōjōshin'' 自性清浄心).

	Here, “mind” does not mean simply mind in the ordinary sense, but something closer to fundamental experience. This is by no means something that manifests itself only in a small number of spiritually exceptional individuals. Marxists, of course, are no exception. As the foundation of all experience, it makes no distinction between ordinary people and sages, and lies on this side of both idealism and materialism.		Here, “mind” does not mean simply mind in the ordinary sense, but something closer to fundamental experience. This is by no means something that manifests itself only in a small number of spiritually exceptional individuals. Marxists, of course, are no exception. As the foundation of all experience, it makes no distinction between ordinary people and sages, and lies on this side of both idealism and materialism.
Line 325:		Line 325:
	“Buddhism and the Development of Communist Thought” (''Kyōsanshugi shisō no tenkai to Bukkyō'' 共産主義思想の展開と仏教) is a 1949 essay by Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦 (1902–1986). It examines the obligations of Buddhists who criticise communism, the social causes of poverty and war, institutional and educational reform, and the possibility of integrating social and spiritual transformation. The essay culminates in a proposal to ground proletarian humanism in the notion of intrinsically pure mind (''jishō shōjōshin'' 自性清浄心), described as fundamental experience.		“Buddhism and the Development of Communist Thought” (''Kyōsanshugi shisō no tenkai to Bukkyō'' 共産主義思想の展開と仏教) is a 1949 essay by Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦 (1902–1986). It examines the obligations of Buddhists who criticise communism, the social causes of poverty and war, institutional and educational reform, and the possibility of integrating social and spiritual transformation. The essay culminates in a proposal to ground proletarian humanism in the notion of intrinsically pure mind (''jishō shōjōshin'' 自性清浄心), described as fundamental experience.

	This translation follows Ichikawa Hakugen, ~~「共産主義思想の展開と仏教」~~, in ~~『市川白弦著作集』 (~~''Ichikawa Hakugen chosakushū'' [Collected Writings of Ichikawa Hakugen]), vol. 2, ~~『禅と現代思想』 (~~''Zen to gendai shisō'' [Zen and Contemporary Thought]) (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1993), pp. 259–272. The [[IH49KST\|Japanese transcription]] uses the same collected edition. Page markers identify printed pages in that edition; English divisions at sentence breaks are approximate.		This translation follows Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦, “''Kyōsanshugi shisō no tenkai to Bukkyō''” 共産主義思想の展開と仏教, in ''Ichikawa Hakugen chosakushū'' 市川白弦著作集 [Collected Writings of Ichikawa Hakugen], vol. 2, ''Zen to gendai shisō'' 禅と現代思想 [Zen and Contemporary Thought] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1993), pp. 259–272. The [[IH49KST\|Japanese transcription]] uses the same collected edition. Page markers identify printed pages in that edition; English divisions at sentence breaks are approximate.

	The essay appeared in ~~『現代佛教問題五講』 (~~''Gendai Bukkyō mondai gokō'' [Five Lectures on Contemporary Buddhist Problems]), edited by Nakajima Bunkyō 中島文鏡 (Tokyo: Young East Sha, 1949). Its page range in that volume and any earlier appearance have not yet been verified.		The essay appeared in ''Gendai Bukkyō mondai gokō'' 現代佛教問題五講 [Five Lectures on Contemporary Buddhist Problems], edited by Nakajima Bunkyō 中島文鏡 (Tokyo: Young East Sha, 1949). Its page range in that volume and any earlier appearance have not yet been verified.

	Translated and annotated by James Mark Shields (2026). This is a working scholarly translation. Certain quotations, historical references, and residual textual questions await final independent verification.		Translated and annotated by James Mark Shields (2026). This is a working scholarly translation. Certain quotations, historical references, and residual textual questions await final independent verification.

IH49KST-T - Revision history

Lajos at 23:44, 8 October 2026

Lajos at 23:33, 8 October 2026

James at 19:00, 8 October 2026

James at 18:57, 8 October 2026