Ichikawa Hakugen, “Marxism and Zen: Notes”
Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦 (1930). “Marxism and Zen: Notes” (Marukusu shugi to Zen—oboegaki マルクス主義と禅――覚え書). (Japanese original here.)
Contents
1. Translation
1.1 Section I
1.2 Section II
1.3 Section III
1.4 Section IV
1.5 Section V
2. Source Note
3. How to Cite this Text
Translation
The editors have assigned me the topic indicated above, but depending on how one approaches it, this is an exceedingly broad question, one that can be resolved only through the painstaking research and practice of numerous scholars. In this essay, I shall confine myself to reviewing and criticizing the various responses thus far advanced from the Buddhist side, while setting out a preliminary outline of my own views. Because of limitations of space, moreover, my account of Marxism's rejection of religion will be allowed to emerge only insofar as is necessary in examining the views of these various thinkers.
I
The responses thus far offered by those who support religion—primarily Buddhism—may, so far as I have seen, be classified approximately as follows. I welcome corrections if I have misunderstood anything.
(A) Concerning the respective standpoints of Marxism and religion
(1) Marxist categories and religious categories are entirely different. Religious people need only conduct themselves as religious people.
— Imanaka Tsugimaro 今中次麿, Chūgai Nippō, April 10, 1930; Akegarasu Haya, ibid.,
April 24; and certain scholars of religion who emphasize the distinctive character of religious values.
(2) Marxism, as a theory of economic reform, should cease its criticism of religion.
— Kimura Taiken, Chūgai Nippō, April 18.
(3) Buddhism is neither idealism nor materialism. Mind and matter are nondual; one must cling neither to mind nor to matter.
— Matsubara Chien, Chūgai Nippō, January 25; Yabuki Keiki and Kimura Taiken, ibid., April 23; Koyanagi Shigeta, Bunka Jihō, March 25.
(4) Through contemplation of emptiness, Buddhism frees itself from attachment to things.
— Takagami Kakushō, Chūgai Nippō, January 26.
(5) The principle of social reform is exhausted by the Mahāyāna bodhisattva path of benefiting oneself and benefiting others. Nothing need be added to this.
— Kihira Tadayoshi, Chūgai Nippō, April 25.
(6) Marxism is itself a kind of religion.
— Kido Mantarō, Shūkyō kenkyū, 「七一二」; Itō Shōshin, Chūgai Nippō, March 5.
(B) Concerning Marxist practice
(7) Class struggle is impermissible.
— Almost all the writers surveyed, although Kido and Itō take somewhat different positions.
(8) Spiritual awakening must come first. Equality cannot be realized unless everyone genuinely awakens.
— Akegarasu Haya, Chūgai Nippō, April 24; Kagawa Toyohiko and Inazu Kizō, ibid., February 2; Yabuki Keiki, ibid., April 20; Nishida Kitarō, Art and Morality (Geijutsu to dōtoku 芸術と道徳), p. 175.
(C) Concerning Marxism's rejection of religion
(9) Marxists confuse religion as it presently exists with the essence of religion. Their rejection is directed only against religion in its present condition.
— Uno Enkū, Chūgai Nippō, February 22; Ifukube Ryūki, ibid., April 22; Kaneko Hakumu, A Religious Critique of Socialism (Shakaishugi no shūkyōteki hihan 社会主義の宗教的批判).
(10) Established religions contain many elements that ought to be rejected.
— Terada Yakichi, Chūō Bukkyō, May 1930; Miki 三木保幾, Yomiuri Shinbun, April 27.
(11) Particular historical forms of religion may be rejected, but the essence of religion cannot be denied, so long as human beings experience the anguish of life and death or possess
a longing for the “infinite.”
— Ifukube Ryūki, Chūgai Nippō, April 22; Kimura Taiken, ibid., April 27.
(12) At the root of class struggle lies human selfishness. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat alike act according to the same principle. First teach them selflessness (muga 無我). Here lies the proper domain of religion.
— Terada Yakichi, Bunka Jihō, December 28, 1929, and various other writers.
(13) Bread alone cannot resolve the problem. Religion becomes a question only after bread has been secured.
— Yabuki Keiki, Chūgai Nippō, April 20; Kawai Teiichi, ibid., April 27.
(14) Buddhism is not what is commonly called otherworldliness. It seeks to establish the Buddha-land here on earth.
— Inazu Kizō, Chūgai Nippō, February 2; and other writers.
(D) Concerning the course Buddhism (or religion) should take in the future
(15) Adopt the socially realistic orientation of Mahāyāna Buddhism, together with its orientation toward spiritual idealism.
— Ono Seiichirō, Yomiuri Shinbun, May 2.
(16) Become socially engaged. Save individuals through engagement with society.
— Kimura Taiken, Yomiuri Shinbun, April 27; Hoashi Riichirō, ibid., May 1.
(17) Abandon otherworldliness and engage with reality.
— Terada Yakichi, Chūō Bukkyō, May.
(18) While maintaining a spiritual standpoint, engage with material conditions.
— Kimura Taiken, Yomiuri Shinbun, April 27.
(19) Do not compromise with materialism. The materialization of religion is the degeneration of religion. Religion's true vocation lies in spiritualizing matter.
— Tsuge Nobuhide, Yomiuri Shinbun, May 23.
(20) Become a movement of the masses; and yet do not become class-based. Embrace all humanity.
— Kimura Taiken, Yomiuri Shinbun, April 27; Miki 三木保幾, ibid., May 6; Hoashi Riichirō, ibid., May 7; Tanaka Kōtarō, ibid., May 6.
II
I shall now examine the views set out above. Given the hurried character of these notes, there will undoubtedly be places where I have failed to express myself fully, or even failed to observe the proper courtesies. I welcome criticism and correction. I shall comment on the arguments in the order of their original numbering; readers are asked to compare the two.
(1) This reflects the capitalist conception of the division of labor—or, alternatively, the Hīnayāna attachment to fixed doctrines (hōshū 法執). Such a habit of compartmentalization divides and sets against one another the many organically interconnected phenomena of life.
The Ten Oxherding Verses (Jūgyūju 十牛頌) describe one who returns to the world, exposing his chest and walking barefoot through the marketplace, covered in dust and ashes, his face filled with laughter.
The liberated person has abandoned even the pride of possessing a separate thing called “religion itself.”
(2) So long as Marxists remain Marxists, and so long as religious people do not cooperate in the struggle to win the materialist conception of history, it is only natural that Marxists will not abandon their rejection of religion. To demand this of them without overcoming historical materialism is meaningless.
(3) “Mind and matter are one; form and mind are nondual”—the opiate-like character of intuitionism lies precisely in brandishing such expressions indiscriminately.
As a pure expression of intuition, this was valid; it correctly pointed toward the world of direct intuition. But once we descend into the world of distinctions, mind has its own principles, just as matter has its own laws.
“Distinction is itself equality” may have significance as an indication of an experiential standpoint. Yet the complacency that wraps itself in the smoke screen of “the unity of mind and matter,” forgetting both material laws and the principles of consciousness, is exceedingly crude.
This is why the ancient sages also sought meticulous discrimination through subsequently attained wisdom (gotokuchi 後得智). Here, what is required is not so much the fusion of mind and matter as their dialectical examination.
(4) The objective is correct. But what holds true for a genius does not necessarily hold true for everyone. What is appropriate for a solitary person is not necessarily appropriate for someone with a spouse and children.
Capitalism has transformed everything—even human beings themselves—into “things,” into commodities. We must therefore also investigate the conditions under which everyone might live, as far as possible, free from domination by material things.
(5) “Do good deeds. The purpose of human life is exhausted by this.” Such a statement is at once perfectly clear and profoundly ambiguous.
But consider a mouse about to be devoured by a cat: how, precisely, is it supposed to practice “benefiting oneself and benefiting others” (jiri rita 自利利他)?
(6) Everything depends upon how religion is defined. At the very least, however, we should attend to one conspicuous difference between conventional religion and Marxism.
Religion seeks to alter one's state of mind in order to forget the oppressive character of one's environment. Marxism, by contrast, seeks to transform the environment and thereby change one's state of mind.
(7) How extraordinary that Buddhists who have affirmed slaughter and warfare under slogans such as “Sword and Zen are one” (kenzen ichinyo 剣禅一如) should now be terrified by the cry of “class struggle” and rush frantically to offer moral guidance!
They must either repent of their past or change their present conduct. This demands serious self-examination.
(8) The criticism offered under (4) can also be applied here.
Furthermore, the argument that equality is pointless because inequalities will inevitably arise again comes perilously close to saying that medical treatment is useless because the patient will eventually fall ill again, or that eating is pointless because one will eventually become hungry again.
(9) I agree with this view. One qualification, however, must be kept in mind.
For Marxists, who seek to comprehend every phenomenon in its historical and actual existence, there can be no eternal and unchanging “essence” of religion apart from the actual historical forms assumed by particular religions.
Consequently, the defense that religion need only return to its original “essence” amounts, from a Marxist standpoint, to an empty slogan.
(10) This is something everyone acknowledges.
(11) The problem of life and death can be resolved without recourse to religion. There have been adherents of Marxism who found peace of mind by entrusting this very problem to Marxist practice—although that is another matter if one chooses to call such a commitment “religion.”
There are, moreover, various kinds of infinity. Extensional infinity—what Hegel called the “bad infinite”—is itself one form of infinity. Yet this is precisely the kind of infinity that we ordinarily desire. The matter calls for more careful examination.
(12) The criticism offered under (4) can also be developed in response to this position. I shall return to the question later.
(13) What does religion propose to do for the millions of unemployed people who are constantly wandering on the brink of starvation? Are distinguished religious teachers concerned only with the salvation of souls?
(14) Buddhism has frequently been defended through statements of this sort. Yet even Christianity has contemplated the coming of the Kingdom of God “on earth.”
Marxism's rejection of religion is directed not principally at overcoming religious doctrines, but at overcoming the idealistic character of religious practice—the illusory methods by which religion proposes to establish its ideal society.
Lenin regarded religion as the illusory happiness of the masses.
(15), (18) Both assertions remain exceedingly vague. The question is how these ideals are to be realized concretely: what means, methods, and sequences of action are required, and what theoretical foundations justify them?
(19) To speak of “spiritualizing matter” is careless. Teachings suggesting that everything depends upon one's state of mind have repeatedly compelled human beings to embrace falsehood and unnatural conduct.
To hold one's nose while eating rotten meat, or to cover one's ears while stealing a bell—this is the magic of spiritualism.
(20) Neither “humanity” nor “human beings in general” exist as undifferentiated abstractions.
Whatever one thinks of their merits, to admonish the masses who seek to abolish class distinctions through struggle against becoming class-conscious, and to preach peace in the name of “humanity,” is—in its actual consequences, whether religious people intend it or not—to support the capitalists who defend the existing order and to intensify the oppression of the propertyless.
Lenin regarded religion as a form of spiritual oppression directed against the proletariat.
In the present age, even ideas such as “humanity,” “peace,” and “universal love” cannot escape the pressures of class division. Thus religion becomes increasingly estranged from the propertyless.
This is not my “opinion.” It is a fact before our eyes.
I shall conclude this criticism by citing Miura Sangendō 三浦参玄洞's remarks:
“Since social movements arise from the objective circumstances of a particular society and historical moment, one must understand that it is impossible to decide in advance whether to proceed to the right
or to the left. When a ship is listing to starboard and about to capsize, passengers who recognize the danger will quickly leap from the right side to the left. At such a moment, even if someone were to shout, ‘The safest place on a ship is in the middle,’ no one would pay the slightest attention.” (Chūgai Nippō, June 28, 1929)
III
What particularly interests us when comparing Eastern and Western thought is the difference between their respective conceptions of “things” or “matter,” and their differing attitudes toward “history.”
To understand the laws of nature and thereby “conquer nature” was the guiding principle of Bacon and, subsequently, of European and American civilization. By contrast, to “wander in accordance with the workings of nature” was the orientation of Zhuangzi and the fundamental disposition of the Eastern spirit. For the former, nature was the nature investigated by the natural sciences; for the latter, it was an intuitive, supra-empirical nature. Consequently, empirical “things” were, for the former, objects to be investigated and conquered, while for the latter they were things to be renounced and transcended. As the Zhuangzi puts it, “Losing oneself in things and losing one's nature in conventionality.”
In both East and West, philosophy began with the “problem of existence” and proceeded toward the dialectical examination of “being” (u 有) and “nonbeing” (mu 無). Yet in the West, the pursuit of being led toward “development,” whereas in the East, the aspiration toward nonbeing led toward “cessation” (jakumetsu 寂滅).
In the former, being and nonbeing became primarily categories of factual cognition; in the latter, they were connected with judgments of value. Accordingly, even with respect to the category of “cause and effect,” the natural-scientific conception of causality characteristic of the West was contrasted in the East with moral or religious causality.
In short, from the standpoint of the Eastern spirit's orientation toward emptiness (kū 空), “things” appeared as “provisionally existent” or “to be renounced.” It must therefore be regarded as almost inevitable that a rigorous science of “things”—that is, natural science—did not develop in the East. Whether one speaks of “elementary learning” or “great learning,” [continues].
…or of “setting one's heart upon learning at fifteen,” all such learning was ultimately nothing other than the learning of the sages.
Next, let us consider “history.” I remarked earlier that Western civilization was oriented toward “development.” Darwin conceived of the “evolution” of living beings, while Bergson expounded “creative evolution” in time. In the East, however, what was sought was a “return to the original source” (henpon gen'gen 返本還源), as in the Ten Oxherding Verses (Jūgyūju 十牛頌), while calls for the “restoration of royal government” were also advanced.
The objective of political revolution was to return to the ancient age of Yao and Shun; the objective of religious reform was likewise to return to the time of the founding patriarchs. It is therefore hardly surprising that the conception of “history” failed to develop in the East, since the essence of historical consciousness lies in “development.”
Thus materialism and historical scholarship—and historical materialism all the more—remained exceedingly remote from the Eastern mind.
Here lies the problem.
How profound and beautiful was the spiritualism of the ancient East! Yet might its disregard for “things” have caused the mind, paradoxically, to stumble over material things, rendered its worldview crude, and encouraged it to conceive the means of practice in merely idealistic terms?
Today, when the material structures of history have become increasingly complex and contradictory, this question demands particular reflection.
IV
(1) Just as we must not distort the principles of mind by imposing upon them the principles of matter, so too must we refrain from violating physical laws through psychological principles.
Many questions that are now simply matters for medicine or natural science were once treated as theological problems. Numerous errors and harmful practices arose in religious forms through ignorance of natural laws—for example, offering sacrifices and praying for rain.
People sometimes sought through religion to escape physical dangers that could be avoided by the means taught by the natural sciences. One might, for instance, attempt to avert lightning through prayer when it could be avoided through the use of a lightning rod.
Here lies one reason why religion has been described as the illusory happiness of the masses.
(2) It is necessary to understand the principles of social development. What determines the course of history is not the religious “gospel,” but rather the economic structure of society.
No one would imagine that the problem of unemployment could be solved through the “gospel” or a charity soup kitchen.
No one would suppose that what can be achieved through the conscious regulation of economic laws could instead be obtained through faith in Inari. Such errors arise from a failure to understand social or economic laws.
For modern people, the god of fate is often nothing more than the circulation of economic forces fluctuating in the marketplace.
(3) Numerous errors arise from misunderstanding the principles governing human relations.
Some religions have maintained that women and slaves cannot attain Buddhahood. Even today, at the foot of Mount Hiei in Kyoto, there remains a stone pillar marking a boundary that prohibits entry to “women and cattle” (nyonin gyūba kekkai 女人牛馬結界). Religious authorities placed women and cattle in the same category. This is indeed a “precious” historical document in the history of women's liberation!
How often has the doctrine of karmic retribution (inga ōhō 因果応報) confined the poor and the oppressed to timidity, servility, and ignorance?
(4) Finally, we must understand the relationship between economic circumstances and human beings.
Most tragedies and crimes have their roots in material hardship. As the saying goes, “Poverty dulls the mind.” Other expressions—“The wealthy do not quarrel,” “When food and clothing are sufficient, people understand propriety,” “Without a secure livelihood there can be no steadfast mind,” and “Upbringing matters more than lineage”—all attest to how closely external circumstances and states of mind are intertwined.
Even if we were ordered to commit murder, we would be unable to do so. The principal reason is that we do not presently find ourselves in circumstances that would lead us to such an act.
Conversely, it would surely be futile to teach a young man sexual restraint while simultaneously exposing him to obscene conduct.
“Do not inquire whether human nature is good or evil; provide favorable conditions” (zen'en 善縁), said Zen Master Dōgen. There is also the story of Mencius's mother moving house three times.
For the development of each person's character, it is necessary to establish the best possible conditions and remove harmful material obstacles.
Those who emphasize spiritual awakening must first understand the importance of the environment. How many people could sit calmly atop a smokestack a hundred jō high?
We must not attempt to guide everyone according to principles that apply only to a genius. Just as awakening (bodai 菩提) has its own principles, delusion (komō 虚妄) has its own necessities. We must guide all people through principles that actually govern their lives.
To reduce every social problem indiscriminately to human selfishness or attachment to the self (gashū 我執) is not necessarily mistaken, but it is exceedingly abstract.
We must guard against the recklessness of attempting to address every social problem through such an empty conception of society.
(5) Yet I am not advocating a “compromise” or “eclectic synthesis” between Buddhism and the materialist conception of history. Compromise and eclecticism invariably diminish the distinctive character of both positions, weaken their vitality, and frequently introduce confusion into the very manner in which they are combined. Here lies the defect of eclecticism. It is rash simply to proclaim, without further consideration, “Become socially engaged!” or “Attend to material conditions!”
(6) To attempt to combine only the conclusions of different worldviews arising from different standpoints is like grafting bamboo onto a tree. We must first undertake a dialectical examination of the standpoints themselves.
Just as Kūkai, in the Treatise on the Ten Stages of Mind (Jūjūshinron 十住心論), and Yanshou, in the Record of the Mirror of the Teachings (Zongjing lu 宗鏡録), sought to organize different standpoints into coherent systems, so too must we, from the standpoint of Zen—grounded in the original nature of the human mind—critically examine and situate the various worldviews.
We must recognize the respective significance and truth of each within its proper position and domain. At the same time, we must select, reject, and subject them to dialectical examination in such a way that they become stages along the path toward Zen, or means of realizing Zen itself.
Here lies the task of correct thinking.
We must not confine ourselves to improvised adjustments in practice, such as simply calling upon Buddhists to engage with reality or sympathize with the propertyless. We must also undertake the revision and systematic reorganization of our worldview.
V
I shall now offer a brief criticism of Marxism.
The essential task of Zen is, first of all, for each person to return to their original face (honrai no menmoku 本来の面目).
The Record of Linji (Rinzai-roku 臨済録) says:
“Upon this mass of red flesh there is a true person of no rank, constantly entering and leaving through the gateways of your face. Those who have not yet verified this—look! Look!”
Now Marx says:
“The only means by which humanity can recover its humanity, its very essence, is through the fundamental overcoming of all religious representations and a resolute return—not to God, but to humanity itself—”
This call for the fundamental overcoming of all religious representations and for a resolute, rightful return to humanity itself can, ironically, be “deepened” into a maxim of Zen.
Zen practice has been the realization of one's true nature (kenshō 見性) and the direct pointing to the human mind (jikishi ninshin 直指人心). It is not a direct pointing toward heaven, nor a direct pointing toward some other shore.
The Zen school brought Buddhist theory and practice—which had been elaborately adorned with mythological and idealistic conceptions—entirely back into the sphere of everyday human life.
“Go drink tea,” “Wash your bowl,” “Three pounds of flax,” “The cypress tree,” “Fine snowflakes falling everywhere,” and “Every day is a good day”: such are its expressions.
In dissolving religious representations into everyday life, and in refusing to adhere to fixed articles of faith, Zen is profoundly non-idealistic. Indeed, for the person who lives Zen, even Buddhism itself becomes a piece of useless furniture.
Nevertheless, before the Marxist notion of a “rightful return to humanity itself” can be deepened into our own maxim, numerous questions must be examined and settled. Accomplishing this is, of course, beyond the purpose of the present essay. Here I shall merely indicate the direction and general outline of such an examination.
(1) Marxism advocates the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is a form of authoritarianism. It seeks to abolish coercive power through coercive power—like attempting to wash a lump of earth with mud.
(2) Marxism confuses the subject with its conditions. However profoundly material things may condition the mind, they can never entirely constitute the conditions of the mind. Food, after all, is not immediately identical with life itself. Do not forget the subject.
(3) Marxism adopts a genetic or developmental approach to mental and cultural phenomena. This approach possesses breadth and novelty. Yet it lacks the depth of intuition.
The Marxist conception of humanity is, so to speak, an investigation of the human skin and flesh, rather than an insight into the innermost essence of the human being. In this respect, its predecessor Feuerbach had advanced further.
(4) Genetic investigation is certainly one method of understanding, but it is not the only method.
One need not know how water came into existence in order to know its taste. We must not suppose that the significance of every cultural phenomenon can be determined entirely through an investigation of its origins.
There are undoubtedly many aspects of religion's origins and significance that can be exposed through Marxist methods and overcome through Marxist practice.
Yet I cannot believe that religion can thereby be wholly negated. The essential seeds of religion lie within the very nature and limitations of what it means to be human.
(5) At the very least, the standpoint upon which Zen rests belongs to a domain that cannot be an object of negation.
Negation can take place only through “thought.” Yet the standpoint of Zen does not lie within the world of thought. It is of the kind expressed by the saying, “The moment you turn toward it, you turn away from it.”
Descartes began his philosophy by doubting the certainty of all existence and truth. Ultimately, he arrived at the self-evidence of “doubting,” or, in other words, of “thinking.”
The standpoint of Zen transcends even such thinking, yet may also be likened to the ground or place (basho 場所) that makes possible the expression and establishment of all thought. Marxism, too, merely dances upon the palm of what transcends thought.
(6) No one is born a Marxist. Everyone becomes one.
The possibility of moving from one worldview to another rests upon the fact that the active dimension of consciousness can always transcend any particular content of consciousness. This is also why Marxists can understand the bourgeois worldview.
Consciousness possesses infinity and universality in itself. Even the materialist Feuerbach acknowledged this.
Actual consciousness is always in contact with something beyond its own contents and is unified through that which transcends them.
(7) Both ignorance (mumyō 無明) and attachment (shūjaku 執着) represent forms in which this unity remains incomplete.
The divisiveness and attachment characteristic of consciousness appear to be inherent in human nature itself. Consequently, although they are frequently stimulated and intensified by our environment, we cannot say that every form of attachment and anxiety is produced by environmental conditions.
So long as human beings possess such a nature and such limitations, they will continually seek to “return” to the primordial “One.”
Thought, as the principle of division, is simultaneously a demand for unity. Yet the ultimate duality cannot be overcome through thought—
…because thought is a principle that processes all phenomena through relations between subject and predicate—that is, through “opposition.” The final opposition must therefore be entrusted to a leap beyond thought. Here lies the path toward Zen.
(8) If the origins of religion can be attributed to contradictions in the material environment, then do animals and plants exploited by human beings likewise possess religion?
There are no contradictions in the environment itself. It must be the human mind that experiences contradictions.
As the verse says: “There is no sorrowful rain upon the banana leaves; it is only those who hear it whose hearts are broken.”
We must first clarify the essential nature of mind. Contradiction exists only insofar as there is mind; conditions exist only insofar as there is a subject.
(9) According to Marx, what distinguishes human beings from animals is material “production.” But was it the material environment that initiated such production?
Human activity must already be acknowledged here. We must therefore investigate the essential nature of human agency.
(10) The Marxist assertion that life determines consciousness is as crude as the following argument: “Police officers are poor. Therefore, they are Marxists.”
Kropotkin was born into the aristocracy and became a revolutionary.
Moreover, this logic provides no grounds for condemning as “traitors” comrades who became reactionaries after their material circumstances improved. Such condemnation can find its justification only from a standpoint that establishes some form of humanitarian ideal.
(11) Hegel, who excluded idealism from his philosophy, thereby concealed within it the seeds of a reactionary philosophy that glorified the existing order, notwithstanding the revolutionary character of his dialectic.
Marxism, which seeks to carry the revolutionary character of dialectics to its logical conclusion, likewise runs the risk—through its exclusion of conscious purpose—of descending into material fatalism or, alternatively, ending in blind destructiveness.
(12) We must establish our objectives as purely and rigorously as possible. Having done so, we must select the most appropriate and effective plans and means for realizing those objectives, adapting them to changes in the material and spiritual structures of our circumstances at any given time.
In doing so, we need only determine our concrete methods through the proper application of induction and deduction. There is no necessity to proceed according to a dialectical schema of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.
Marxism proclaimed its liberation from metaphysics, yet through dialectical materialism it has once again plunged into metaphysics.
Now, I shall attempt to summarize the objective I have in mind:
“To take as our ultimate aim the fullest possible realization and enjoyment, by all people, of their inherently endowed nature of mind; to establish the spiritual and material conditions necessary for this purpose; and, toward that end, for everyone to work according to their abilities, receive according to their needs, and endure only the minimum sacrifice recognized as necessary by the clearest possible exercise of reason.”
In pursuit of this comprehensive objective, we must sometimes attend to the purity of mind, sometimes seek guidance in the universality of principle, and sometimes trace the myriad transformations of particular circumstances.
Through direct intuition, critical reflection, and investigation, we continually aspire to fulfill the Buddhist path “together with all sentient beings.”
Source Note
“Marxism and Zen: Notes” (Marukusu shugi to Zen—oboegaki マルクス主義と禅――覚え書) is a 1930 essay by Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦 (1902–1986). It catalogs twenty positions advanced by other religious thinkers; these positions should not automatically be read as Ichikawa's own. His replies address them selectively, including a joint response to items (15) and (18).
This translation follows the Japanese transcription IH30MTZ and the text printed in 『市川白弦著作集』 (Ichikawa Hakugen chosakushū [Collected Writings of Ichikawa Hakugen]), vol. 3, pp. 219–232. The essay reportedly appeared in Chūō Bukkyō 中央仏教 in June 1930; the original issue, collected volume imprint, and text require final verification. Page markers correspond to the Japanese source and link back to the original.
Translated and annotated by James Mark Shields (2026). This is a provisional translation pending final diplomatic collation. The meaning of 「唯物史観を戦い取る」 in II (2) remains under review because the following sentence also refers to 「唯物史観を克服せずして」. The abbreviation 「七一二」 following 『宗教研究』, the exact source of the Marx quotation in Section V, selected proper-name readings, and the Hegel reference in V (11) require further verification. Editorial readings are not silently substituted for the historical text.
How to Cite this Text
Ichikawa Hakugen (1930). “Marxism and Zen: Notes” (Marukusu shugi to Zen—oboegaki マルクス主義と禅――覚え書). Translated and annotated by James Mark Shields. The Radical Buddhism Project. Version of 21 October 2026. https://radicalbuddhism.net/wiki/IH30MTZ-T.
